

The Promotion of Mass Movements by the Colonial Government in the 1930s: A New Perspective on Japanese Wartime Imperialism in Korea

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Abstract

This article aims to explore the Japanese colonial government’s efforts to promote mass movements in Korea which rose suddenly and showed remarkable growth throughout the 1930s. It focuses on two Governor-Generals and the directors of the Education Bureau who created the Social Indoctrination movements under Governor-General Ugaki Kazushige in the early 1930s and the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement of Governor-General Minami Jirō in the late 1930s. The analysis covers their respective political motivations, ideological orientation, and organizational structure. It demonstrates that Ugaki, under the drive to integrate Korea with an economic bloc centered on Japan, adapted the traditional local practices of the colonized based on the claim of “Particularities of Korea,” whereas the second Sino-Japanese War led Minami to emphasize assimilation, utilizing the ideology of the extended-family to give colonial power more direct access to individuals as well as obscuring the unequal nature of the colonial relationship. It argues that the colonial government-led campaigns constituted a core ruling mechanism of Japanese imperialism in the 1930s.

Key Words: Migration; Japanese imperialism; Cultural assimilation

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The Movement for Rural Revitalization, launched by the Government-General in 1932, inaugurated an era of state-led movements in Korean history. From that year, similar campaigns were utilized through the end of the colonial rule. Examples include the Movement for Self-Reliance, the Movement for Public Works, the Movement for Developing Mind and Land, the Movement to Awaken National Spirit, the “Be Kind” Movement, the Movement to Obey the Law and economic savings movements. There were also numerous campaigns aiming to reform specific customs including clothing, cooking, punctuality, rituals, smoking, cleaning, and even physical exercise. The rise of state-led movements was a significant turning point in Japanese colonial rule. In contrast to the previous approach of maintaining good relations with a small number of landlords and local elites in order to implement its economic policies, this development signified the growing desire of the Government-General towards establishing a direct relation with the Korean masses. The fact that all these campaigns used the term “movement” signifies that they sought the participation of the Korean masses in their agenda. The themes of the movements show that the colonial government aimed for a deeper intervention into their everyday lives. In analyzing the motivations behind the changes and the approaches to Korean mass society, this article aims to examine the attempts of the colonial government to mobilize the colonial masses in the 1930s.

On state-led movements of the 1930s, academic research has generally focused on the Movement for Rural Revitalization in the early 1930s and the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement after the outbreak of war between Japan and China in July 1937. Both of these movements were integrated into the National Total Force Movement in 1940 in a bid to realize “Korean New Order,” the counterpart of the “New Order” in Japan. Examining the political backdrop of the former, historians have noted the pressing concern of the colonial government to maintain social stability in a Korean society they saw as under the hold of anti-Japanese nationalism and socialism. Some interpreted it as a vital means for the social control in the rural area and detailed actual local practices, whereas others argued that it laid the foundation for the transition to state-corporatism, with a focus on the state-society relations.¹ In existing scholarship, the outbreak of war was the bridge to the latter movement which promoted voluntary participation in the wartime mobilization. Social control turned into more intensive mobilization, while state-corporatism swiftly developed into the wartime mobilization system. The focus of the movements, on the economy, and spiritual life, were utilized in two major aspects of wartime mobilization: the economic and ideological wars.

In existing scholarship, it was assumed that the Government-General's campaigns mainly relied on bureaucratic force, thereby unwittingly ignoring the differences between the two movements. Contesting this assumption, I focus on the fact that the policies were implemented in the form of mass movements. Given that the success of movements, from the Japanese perspective, was determined by a perception of consent to the cause and the extent of participation, the colonial government needed to convince Koreans to join the campaigns. However, no matter how hard the colonial government pushed, it was unlikely that Korean society readily give its consent, considering how strong feelings were of anti-Japanese nationalism, as well as interest in anti-imperialistic socialism. The colonial government therefore needed both an organizational and an ideological approach capable of shifting anti-Japanese sentiment into pro-Japanese feeling, and of overriding networks developed by socialists or nationalists.

The colonial government's planning strategies reflected its historical situation, rooted in broader historical conditions, Japanese imperialism, and the conditions at the specific moment. The main aspects of the time were the creation of an economic bloc in the early 1930s and the outbreak of war in the late 1930s. These two aspects were not well integrated with each other. Although the colonial government was designed to realize the interests of the Japanese empire, the economic bloc pushed it to represent local interests—i.e. that of its own bloc within the empire. Generally speaking, modern imperialism, in general, was based on differences that not only excluded colonies from political and full legal citizenship but also made their economy dependent on that of the colonizer. By contrast, modern war, which involved mobilization of not only military force but also economic and ideological resources, tended to deemphasize social inequalities from class, gender, and ethnicity; this fact is demonstrated in the greater emphasis on assimilation policies in this period. The contradictions among modern imperialism, the economic bloc, and warfare are particularly clear in the languages of these movements and their organizations.

Arguing that the rise of state-led movements represented a new imperial ruling mechanism, this paper examines both the factors behind the transition and the strategic approach of the colonial government toward the colonial society, covering movements that were launched both before and after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. More specifically, this article examines two movements: the Social Indoctrination Movements in the early 1930s and the National Spiritual General Mobilization Movement in the late 1930s. The primary sources used include Government-General documents and the diary of the Governor-General, transcriptions of speeches and the writings of directors of the Education Bureau. This article is divided into three parts. The first part discusses Governor-General Ugaki's views on the economic role of Korea within the Japanese imperial economic bloc; this will provide a greater understanding of the historical background behind the emergence of the state-led mass movements. In part two, I

analyze the social indoctrination movements under Ugaki, with a focus on directors of the Education Bureau who drafted the plans for the colonial government-led movements and then implemented them. The last section discusses the National Spiritual General Mobilization Movement under Governor-General Minami Jirō, shifting the focus from the relation of state-led movements with the economic bloc to its relation to war.

Ugaki Kazushige and the Rise of Social Indoctrination Movement

Governor-General Ugaki Kazushige (宇垣一成, 1868–1956) arrived in Korea in June 1931, right after he stood down as Minister of Army, taking responsibility for the March Incident, a political coup in which some young military officers attempted to make him prime minister. Having previously served as interim Governor-General in 1927, he was familiar with both Korea and the office. On arriving in Korea, he began to map out a colonial policy suitable to the political economic changes of Japan in the early 1930s.

There were heated debates in Japan on the economic bloc in response to the economic crisis which swept the world in the late 1920s. Japan had depended on Great Britain and the United States financially for its imperialistic expansion in the early twentieth century. The turn of these Western powers toward protectionism through the establishment of economic blocs dealt a serious economic blow to Japan, leading it to turn to economic autarchy in order to overcome the economic crisis. Central to the economic bloc in East Asia were the close economic links between Japan and Manchuria. That region was dominated by the Kwantung Army, which had been formed in Manchu area in 1906 when Japan obtained after the Russo-Japanese War; it played a central role in building Manchukuo later. Among the Japanese government, Japanese capitalists and the Kwantung army, however, there were wide differences of opinion on the roles of respective blocs and the extent to which the state would control the economy. Reformists in the Kwantung Army wanted to build economic autarchy through economic control by the state. They were opposed to the advance of Japanese *zaibatsu*, industrial and financial business conglomerates, to Manchuria. Criticizing *zaibatsu* for pursuing only their own private interests and their private desires for the economic crisis, they planned to develop heavy industries in Manchuria under state control. By contrast, the Japan-Manchuria Business Council representing the business sector saw Manchuria as a channel to relieve the economic depression of Japan. Considering Manchuria as a market for Japan, they wanted to import primary resources from Manchuria and to export consumer goods to it. The Japanese government took steps to promote the advance of *zaibatsu* in preparation for total war.²

Along with observing the talk on the economic bloc, Ugaki suggested his own concept of locating Korea as an economic link between Japan and Manchuria. Envisioning that the East Sea/Sea of Japan, surrounded by Japan, Soviet Union, Manchuria and Korea, would be the center of the

future East Asian economic bloc,³ he sought to promote a hierarchical division of labor in the region. He argued that Japan would be the leading advanced industrial power of the East Asian region while Korea would develop primary industries to support Japanese industry and the economic role of Manchuria would be to supply foodstuffs and natural resources.⁴ He expected that the division of economic roles would minimize the tensions within the bloc, enhance interdependence among regions, and ultimately bring economic autarky to Japan.⁵ For these reasons, he believed it very crucial to industrialize Korea's economy to supplement the economic weakness of Japan.⁶

To optimize Korea's economic contribution, Ugaki reconfigured industry on the peninsula, dividing Korea into two economic regions: one in the south and one in the north. He expected the southern part of Korea, a densely populated grain-producing region, to supply cotton and rice, believing that securing a supply of cotton would soon become a pressing issue for the Japanese textile industry. Northern Korea, less developed and less populated but rich in natural resources, was to be the region for the iron and steel industry and for the production of electricity. Since most of the population was located in the south, he encouraged Koreans to immigrate to the north or to Manchuria to participate in the development projects there. To support these policies, he pushed to construct roads and railroads to make transportation between Japan, Korea and Manchuria more efficient and convenient.⁷

The restructuring of the Korean economy required a huge sum of capital. Aid from the Japanese government was unlikely not only because its core focus was on Manchuria, but also because the economic downturn made the Japanese government more conservative with its fiscal policy. Frustrated with the lack of support from Japanese bureaucrats,⁸ Ugaki turned to Japanese *zaibatsu* and the Korean landlord class who were willing to invest their money in industry.⁹ To lure private capital, the Government-General offered favorable conditions such as cheap and abundant labor and the absence of laws to restrict the unlimited use of labor and capital. Though Japan enacted the Factory Law and the Law to Control Important Industries,¹⁰ they were not applied to Korea. Other problems existed such as opposition to the Government-General and class tensions among landlords and peasants, as well as capitalists and workers, which had already reached alarming levels. Since annexation in 1910, the colonial government made alliances with small groups within the dominant class. They gave exclusive benefits to the traditional aristocratic class and allowed them to create advisory bodies even though they had little decision-making authority.¹¹

In local society, they utilized the traditional local elites and re-educated a minority of people who received elementary education. To carry out their economic policies, they firmly supported the landlord class in their conflicts with peasants, rather than reducing tensions through reform of the landlord-tenant system.¹² It is no wonder that the majority of Koreans were suffering from

widespread poverty, food shortages, and debt in the early 1930s.¹³ Granting benefits to the landlord class aggravated class conflicts, leading to local protests against landlords as well as nationwide organized strikes by peasants and workers. Consequently, socialism and anti-Japanese nationalism spread rapidly amongst Koreans.¹⁴

Ugaki defended the Government-General, by attributing the origins of widespread poverty to individual indolence rather than to the degree of economic exploitation by the colonialist and dominant classes—both landlords and capitalists. In his view, inertia became a characteristic of Koreans since their lives had been fully of frustration for such a long time. He said, “The ethic of hard work and frugality disappeared from the everyday lives of Koreans, and they no longer had the strong will to overcome difficulties by themselves.”¹⁵ What made it worse was that the majority of peasants, eighty percent of the total population, did not have opportunities to move into the modern sector of the economy, still living within a pre-modern subsistence economy. In consequence, every household in rural areas accumulated debts over time, which became an immediate cause of their poverty. Also, he ascribed anti-Japanese nationalism to Koreans’ groundless prejudice against Japan. Given the harsh reality of international politics in East Asia in the early twentieth century, he felt that Korea would not survive on their own, but Koreans did not understand their situation, leading them to reject the goodwill of Japan. He said that the reconfirmed principle of self-determination after WWI and the rise of socialism unnecessarily intensified the bias of Koreans against Japan, thereby increasing anti-Japanese sentiment.¹⁶

Whilst shifting the blame to Koreans, the Government-General ran up against widespread poverty, conflicts between landlords and peasants, and resistance as it endeavored to shield the people from the forces of socialism and nationalism.

Faced with the conflicting tasks of giving benefits to capitalists and landlords and of enhancing the social milieu unfavorable to the colonial rule, Ugaki developed programs of “social indoctrination.” It was a new term in state discourse that appeared in the 1920s in the context of social work. Under criticism that economic aid to poverty-stricken people was just a temporary solution, the colonial government began to shift the focus of social work from economic relief to poverty prevention. The focus of social indoctrination was bi-pronged: education on the reform of everyday life; and community-oriented welfare through settlement work, medical facilities, and libraries.¹⁷ These principles were well suited to Ugaki, who wanted to avoid legal or institutional reform and promote economic investment from the private sector but had to reduce social unrest. The Government-General began to make efforts to offer the practical vocational education, to reform everyday life, and to build communal cooperatives.

The promotion of social indoctrination marked two substantial shifts from previous years. First,

the Government-General now took an interest in the Korean masses. Before the 1930s, they did not have much interest in the development of human resources, because its economic policies focused on turning Korea into a market for Japanese products and a major supplier of rice, agricultural products and natural resources.¹⁸ Though the Government-General urgently needed skilled workers and peasants with practical knowledge and techniques, Korean society was unsuited for the economic development projects, as seen in the statement by an official that “Koreans did not have knowledge, techniques and notions of themselves as public persons because of the lack of education and the primitive level of social life.”¹⁹ The underdeveloped economic skills of Koreans were no longer a problem at the individual level; they were now an obstacle to the implementation of colonial policies. The importance of enlightening the Korean masses increased with a focus on vocational training and practical education in everyday life.²⁰

Secondly, social indoctrination programs were explicitly called “movements,” a term whose use was refreshing at the time. Before the 1930s, the Government-General associated the term with negative meanings. In the 1910s, they denied Koreans the freedom of assembly, for fear of giving opportunities for Koreans to make collective claims against them. Their concerns proved to be justified, although they could not forbid assembly completely. News of a declaration of independence by thirty-three people in a small restaurant quickly swept Korea, triggering a nationwide protest against Japan in 1919 in what became known as the March First Movement. Even in the 1920s, when a limited degree of non-political social movements were allowed, the colonial government maintained its vigilance.²¹ The Government-General even replaced the term “movement” (運動, *undong* in Korean) with “program” (事業, *saöp* in Korean) in introducing the Local Improvement Movement to Korea in that decade. Strikingly, they turned the previous reluctance toward movements into a willingness to make use of group-oriented force. To prevent the colonial government-led movements from being disoriented, Ugaki suggested the slogan “Harmony between Japan and Korea” (內鮮融和, *naesön yunghwa* in Korean and *naisen yuwa* in Japanese) as the ideological orientation and urged Koreans to have consciousness of their duties as a “public person” (公民, *kongmin* in Korean).²² The rise of mass movements led by the colonial government manifested a salient feature of the new imperial ruling mechanism.

The Education Bureau and “Something Characteristic of Korea” (朝鮮特殊性, *Chosön t’ŭksusŏng*)

Ugaki’s plan to promote social stability and economic industrialization through educational approach started to be put into action with the transfer of the Social Section from the Bureau of Home Affairs to the Education Bureau in 1932. The reshuffle was unusual not only because the Section’s main task had been the relief of poverty, an area that appeared unrelated to education, but also because the Education Bureau had nothing to do with unemployment, social conflicts,

job research centers, and management of public facilities.²³

In the reorganization, Ugaki appointed three people who had no working experience in education or social work as directors of the Education Bureau: Hayashi Shigeki (1931–1933), Watanabe Yutahiro (1933–1935), and Tominaga Fumikazu (1935–1937). What the three directors had in common was the fact that they were among the officials most knowledgeable about Korea. All of them began their career in Korea during the 1910s right after graduating from Tokyo Imperial University. When they were appointed as director of the Bureau, all of them already spent more than ten years in Korea.²⁴ During their long stay, they were involved in local development projects, either the Campaign for Rural Revitalization or the Self-Revitalization program which gave them some fame.²⁵ The Government-General also appointed Koreans as chiefs of the Social Section. This was also striking given the marginalized status of Koreans in the colonial bureaucracy. In 1938, there were just a few Koreans among the 230 high-ranking officials in the central Government-General office. One of the twelve Koreans was the chief of the Social Section.²⁶

Both the Japanese directors and the Korean chiefs of the Section agreed that Korean society was so different from Japan that the existing programs for social indoctrination should be revised. Watanabe Yutahiro said, “We need to make a correction quickly. The social policies *inappropriate* to Korea under the *wrong prejudice* will invite critical *difficulties* in several years” (italics added).²⁷ What he meant by “wrong prejudice” was that officials generally thought that Korean society was similar to Japanese society; however, he saw that view as wrong because there were clear differences between the two. For him, one of the greatest differences was that Korea was more of an agricultural society, with about eighty percent of the population living in rural areas, whereas Japan was more urbanized. A lack of understanding of Korean society led to a failure to consider whether social work projects developed in Japan were suitable to Korean society and to be selective in employing Japanese social work programs. Noting that social work in Korea was focused on urban areas, he argued that it would cause difficulties, because such works would not be well-received by Koreans and would also waste money and effort. He insisted on turning the focus away from urban areas toward rural areas, as would be logical for Korean society.²⁸

The Bureau’s shift in focus to rural areas made their position similar to that of Korean nationalists who were already engaged in campaigns for the improvement of everyday life and of economic production through education campaigns and the formation of cooperatives. Since the 1920s, under the Government-General’s Cultural Policy which eased its suppression of Korean activities, Korean nationalists began to form non-political cultural movements, turning their attention to the masses. For example, Protestant Christian groups began cultural enlightenment movements, trying to avoid direct conflict with the Government-General. As their education

programs and local improvement programs were well-received by Koreans, their network began to form roots in the local society.²⁹ Likewise, Korean socialists, closely connected with labor unions and peasant unions, were about to shift to a strategy of going “Into the Masses,” in the growing recognition of their significance in the early 1930s.³⁰

What the Government-General, nationalists, and socialists had in common was their criticism of the profit-oriented individualism of modern society. Nonetheless, they were at odds with one another, aiming for different goals. While Korean nationalists were opposed to Japanese rule and the socialist movement aimed to bring an end to imperialism as an essential step in abolishing capitalism, the colonial government wanted to pursue the interests of Japan. The Bureau felt it necessary to distinguish its projects from and be more effective than movements led by Koreans; thus, they needed to pursue initiatives popular with Koreans and to organize networks that were efficient and familiar to Koreans.³¹

The phrase “Harmony between Morality and Economy” encapsulated the response of the Bureau to Korean nationalists and socialists. The term “economy” referred to the goal of eliminating hunger and reducing debt. The term “morality” included the promotion of self-reliance to manage their lives efficiently, without depending on others and without attributing individual hardship to external causes; it also promoted a communal sense considering public interests, mutual understanding among people from different classes for the sake of co-prosperity, and a rational way of thinking in everyday lives.³² Hayashi Shigeki deplored the lack of morality among Koreans, attributing its loss to the rich who were endlessly selfish to an inhumane degree, without taking account of the impact of their behavior on other Koreans. Their ruthless pursuit of individual prosperity triggered the widespread economic hardship of other Koreans. At the same time, he railed against the poor whose efforts to overcome economic hardship had been lacking but who blamed their situation on the class system, which led them to accept the theory of class struggle. He argued that the missing morality made the schism between the classes—landlord vs. peasant, and capitalists vs. workers—deeper.³³

On the basis of the claim that the separation of economic life from moral life generated social problems, the Bureau stressed that social indoctrination movements should not emphasize only spiritual reform or material improvement. Hayashi predicted that the movements promoting only economic improvement would result in making personal profit-oriented activities predominant, ultimately deepening the class struggle. On the other hand, a moral life without an economic basis could be critiqued that it was too ideal and abstract to be realized and that disinterest in economic improvement ultimately would lead Koreans to turn their back on Government-General programs. When economic activities were supported by morality, he claimed that the pursuit of interest would not decline into a selfishness that would intensify class struggles; instead,

it would be a stimulus for economic development.³⁴ In short, the slogan of Harmony between Morality and Economy was a useful means to get the support of Koreans and a critical vehicle to check communism and the people's profit-oriented individualism.

When the Government-General turned toward rural areas, they found that they could not outdo Korean nationalists and socialists in organizations. During the 1910s, when local administration was reorganized, they rezoned the traditional customary districts, renaming them "towns" (面, *myŏn* in Korean). In this process, naturally-formed regions were split and re-combined for the convenience of colonial rule. As this reorganization created constant friction between local administration and local society, directives from the central government were not well received by Koreans.³⁵ Aware that Korean society still had a deep connection to their original localities, there was increasing support within the Bureau to consider returning to Korean traditional practice. Yi Kak-chong, an advisor to the Bureau, asserted that Koreans still had a strong connection to their naturally-formed villages in the early 1930s. He pointed out that local officials were heavily dependent on the leaders of traditional villages in dealing with local administration. It seemed that the notion of villages could not be readily dissolved, because they were evolved from families, a very strong social bond in Korean society. Families accumulated communal property in the name of their family and built communal memorial places to hold regular gatherings; grounded on the intimate economic and familial relationships, they overcame economic hardship together and even had social edification functions. Given the strong bonds of villages, he was convinced that the social indoctrination movements should make use of traditional villages.³⁶ Seeing the Korean traditional communal practice as a kind of a region-centered social work, Hayashi ordered a nationwide survey on the existing Community Compact (鄉約, *hyangyak* in Korean) in 1932.³⁷

When Hayashi encouraged local governments to utilize Community Compacts in the social indoctrination movement, Tominaga Fumikazu, a future director of the Bureau from 1935 to 1937, was the governor of North Hamgyŏng province. He had already expressed deep interest in Community Compacts, publishing several articles and a book about them in the early 1920s. Tominaga observed that traditional local society in the Chosŏn period was the site where the power of the centralized bureaucracy came into contact with the authority of local elites. In Tominaga's view, neither of them could achieve domination over the other. State power was centralized as the government could dispatch officials to local regions, but they could not dominate over local elites nor had detailed knowledge of local society. On the other hand, local nobles had substantial authority in local society, grounded in their economic power through land ownership and in the hereditary class system; however, they could not be fully autonomous from the central government.³⁸ Their point of contact was the institution of the Community Compact. He saw that the Community Compact enabled local elites to exercise socio-political

authority over local society under the central bureaucratic structure. The combination of local networks with the central administrative hierarchy made it easy to spread their conception of morality, changed the nature of local self-governance, and allowed them to avoid a direct clash with the central government. At the same time, he observed that government officials, unfamiliar with local society, turned to the Community Compact for help in dealing with taxes, local safety, and mutual cooperation in economic hardship. The compacts were essential both for local elites to keep the local society safe and to lessen the economic hardships under their leaderships and for officials to govern local society. He concluded that there was no clear dividing line between the central administration and the local community compact.³⁹

Noting the Government-General's strained relations with local Korean society, Tominaga warned that the ignorance of these characteristics of Korean society and the neglect of Korean social practices would lead officials to force policies on the Koreans. This would make local administration superficial and ineffective. Supportive of Hayashi's policy, he began to adapt traditional community compacts into the Kwanbuk Community Compact in North Hamgyŏng province, a region so notorious for peasant movements that the Government-General felt it difficult to govern in the 1930s.⁴⁰ Loyalty to the state and subordination to the officials were added to compacts to provide assistance to the Movement for Rural Revitalization and to undermine the peasant movement. Each village was obliged to have regular meetings four times a year as well as temporary meetings, build village storehouses, and store some provisions for the economic emergencies. They encouraged, among other things, women's outdoor activities, the abolishment of early marriage, frugality, and hygiene.⁴¹ Starting in June 1932, the number of Kwanbuk Community Compacts reached 436, and their membership totaled 43,796 in 1934 (counting only the heads of household).⁴² After being promoted to director of the Bureau, Tominaga pushed other local communities to revive and improve existing Korean local traditions.⁴³ From the early to mid 1930s, the traditional practices of the colonized were incorporated into the colonial government's movements by the Education Bureau.

Governor-General Minami Jirō, Director of Education Bureau Shiobara Tokisaburo, and National Spiritual General Mobilization Movement

In August 1936, a year before the outbreak of the war against China, Minami Jirō (南次郎, 1874–1955), the Governor-General nominee, came to Korea by ship. It was the second time that Minami succeeded Ugaki in a position in the 1930s. He had appointed as Ugaki's successor as Minister of Army when he resigned from Minister of the Army in 1931 and then became the Governor-General in Korea. After the Manchurian Incident, Minami assumed the positions of commander of the Kwantung Army and of Japanese ambassador to Manchukuo in 1934, but he stood down in 1936 due to the February 26 Incident in Japan. Later, he became the Governor-

General in Korea upon the recommendation of Ugaki.

As roughly reflected in their career paths, Minami was known to be close to Ugaki. He inherited Ugaki's economic policies, promoting the development of military-related industries as a preparatory step for war.⁴⁴ Unlike Ugaki, who had a difficult relationship with the Kwantung Army,⁴⁵ Minami was on good terms with the Kwantung Army, even though his views were different from that of reform-minded military officers. His good relations with leading figures in both Korea and Manchuria enabled him to act as a moderating force when tensions within the empire emerged. On arriving in Korea, Minami, aiming to reconcile with the Army, arranged compromise measures over conflicting matters between Ugaki and Kwantung Army.⁴⁶

The conciliatory stance of Minami was expressed in two major slogans: "Chosŏn and Manchuria are like one" (鮮滿一如, *sŏnmanilyŏ* in Korean) and "Japan and Korea are One Body" (內鮮一體, *naesŏnilch'e* in Korean). In the context of Japanese imperial politics, they were clearly different from two earlier slogans, "Korea's Particularities" and "Harmony between Japan and Korea" (內鮮融和, *naesŏnyunghwa* in Korean), that captured Ugaki's main approach to colonial rule. Ugaki's emphasis on the particularities of the colonies clearly demonstrates his view that imperial order could be maintained through hierarchical but cooperative relations between the core and the periphery. He thus did not apply Japanese law in Korea indiscriminately but introduced changes where necessary; he took Korea's situation into account as long as it did not undermine the general interest of the Japanese empire, causing tension with the Kwantung Army from time to time. By contrast, Minami rejected the notion of the uniqueness of Korea, viewing Korea as a part of Japan. His slogans expressed the increasingly homogenizing tendencies of the colonial government, thereby shifting into totalitarian rhetoric, especially after the outbreak of the war against China in July 1937. The shift toward assimilation led to the launching of the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement, whose foremost goal was the making of Japanese imperial subjects (皇國臣民化; *kominka* in Korean).

The political views of the new Governor-General were reflected in the social indoctrination movements led by the Social Section in the Education Bureau. Minami put the Social Section back under the Home Bureau. Actually, it was neither sensible that the Education Bureau was tasked with the immigration from abroad and the promotion of a slew of construction projects, nor viable for them to handle the growing amount of labor-related tasks.⁴⁷ After returning the Social Section to the Bureau of Home Affairs, Minami created a Social Education Section in the Education Bureau, thereby separating cultural and educational forms of social work from other kinds. The Social Education Section was charged with three main tasks. First, they undertook ideological projects, such as programs for awakening national spirit, education of "sound"

ideology against socialism, organization of the youth groups and wives' groups. Second, they launched campaigns for the reform of daily life, and third, it managed social education facilities including the Community Compact, the Association for Movement for Rural Revitalization, and local village hall, platforms for displaying the Japanese national flag, Shinto Shrines, public wells, and public baths.⁴⁸

The organizational change gained momentum when Shiobara Tokisaburo was appointed as the new director of the Education Bureau. In contrast to the three previous directors who were conversant with Korean culture and traditional local practices, he had little experience in Korea. After graduating from the Law School of Tokyo Imperial University, he worked at the Ministry of Transportation (Teishinshō) in Japan and moved to Taiwan and then to Manchuria. While working in Manchuria, he became acquainted with Minami, who was the commander of Kwantung Army at that time. He did not go to Korea until 1937, when Minami recruited him for a position. He was first assigned to the Secretariat in the Government-General, soon promoted as director of the Bureau in July 1937. He became the *de facto* head of all wartime mobilization programs until March 1940 when he was promoted to director of the Occupation Bureau in Japan.

The outbreak of war brought about a rapid shift in the goals of the colonial state's movements. They now focused on making a contribution to the war effort, from buttressing the economic bloc to maintaining social stability by reducing anti-Japan sentiment and interest in socialism. Seeing modern war as a "total war," Shiobara extended the scope of war beyond the use of military force to the economy and ideology.⁴⁹ As the military draft was not applied to the colonized yet, Koreans were to contribute to the war effort in both the economic and ideological sectors.

During wartime, consumption became an increasingly critical aspect of the state economy. It had been a concern of state-led campaigns in the 1930s. There had been campaigns that promoted savings at both the individual and communal level with the aim of lessening individual poverty. Savings also became thought of as a basic means to curb inflation as well as a primary source of finance for domestic industry; this was important since financing from Japan was decreasing. Frugality became essential to overcome the sharp drop of commodity imports from Japan.⁵⁰

Shiobara, well aware that threats or coercion would neither reduce consumption nor result in the ideological support from Koreans in their everyday lives, framed the issue as a contrast between the East and the West in order to encourage Koreans' voluntary commitment to the state. In his view, Koreans preoccupied with nationalism failed to understand the West's attack on one of the East's most beautiful virtues, community-based traditions. What was the most pressing task to

break through the East Asian crisis was for Koreans to concentrate on the peace and prosperity of East Asia and the recovery of the lost beauty of Asian culture.⁵¹ Central to the liberation of East Asian society from the West was Japanese spirit centered on the figure of the Japanese emperor. Called “Japanese totalitarianism” at the time, it was distinguished from that of Germany. Having originated in class struggle as well as the belief in the physical superiority of Germans, Nazism was seen as losing the spiritual force of totalitarianism and becoming no more than a biased and exclusive form of nationalism and aggressive imperialism. By contrast, Japanese totalitarianism was exalted as a true totalitarianism, based on a peaceful ideology that the world is like one extended family (*hakkōichiu* in Japanese, 八紘一宇).⁵² The homogenizing rhetoric, resonant with the notion of *nasōnilch’e* (Japan and Korea are one body), was realized in the notion of “imperial subjects,” a neologism allegedly invented by Shiobara.

In the pursuit of Japanese totalitarianism and the voluntary restraint of consumption, what mattered most to Shiobara was the organizational structure. For him, the ideal organization was not a mere collection of individual groups but something that functioned organically from top to bottom for a national goal. He believed that a solid network in a perfect order would train individual habits and everyday behaviors that would ultimately lead Japan to victory in the war.⁵³ After conducting a review of the movements’ scope, institutional structure, and interaction with Koreans, however, he felt that the existing institutions of the social indoctrination movements in the early 1930s were not well suited to carry out the important tasks of the late 1930s.⁵⁴ He bemoaned the fact that three-quarters of Koreans were out of reach of social indoctrination, explaining their situation as follows:

The total population of Korea is twenty-three million. Those who have had any education are only about between one million twenty thousand to one million thirty thousand. That is less than one twentieth [of the Korean population]. All members of youth groups, of women’s organizations, and of the institutions involved the Movement for Improving Rural Areas total just five million. Seventeen million people are still out of the reach of social indoctrination...⁵⁵

This short remark reveals Shiobara’s concern, acknowledging that three-quarters of Koreans out of the reach of social indoctrination might be neither positively inclined toward Japan nor committed to the causes of Japanese empire.

Women were the group that had been the most ignored in social indoctrination efforts. In the early twentieth century, one striking phenomenon was the increasing advance of Korean women in society. The growth of urbanization and the opening of formal education to women broadened the spectrum of occupations for them such as factory workers, educators, clerks, artists, and musicians. The change in the status of women was marked by the emergence of the

notion of the “New Woman” (*sin yŏsŏng*), though there are still debates on how widespread they were. However, the advance of women was restricted to only a few sectors of society. Government-General statistics in 1940 showed that 78.1 percent of women were unemployed, 83 percent of women with jobs were in agriculture, and 5.6 percent were working in commerce.⁵⁶ School attendance among girls eligible to go to elementary school was just 5.4 percent in 1927 and did not exceed 10 percent until 1936, as indicated in Table 1. Despite the emergence of the “new woman,” the lives of the majority of Korean women remained unchanged until the late 1930s. The concern of a lecturer recruited by the Government-General that women’s attendance was unsatisfactory and that even educated women were losing interest in society after marriage echoed the colonial government’s fear that Korean women would not be interested in taking on jobs in the total war.⁵⁷

Table 1: Elementary School Attendance⁵⁸

Year	Total Number	Rate of Attendance	Male students	Rate of Attendance (male)	Female students	Rate of Attendance (female)
1927	451,031	16.8	380,053	27.7	70,978	5.4
1930	489,889	17.3	404,000	28.0	85,889	6.2
1931	499,160	17.6	409,502	28.4	89,658	6.4
1936	798,224	25.9	624,854	40.0	173,370	11.4
1937	900,657	28.8	694,029	43.8	206,628	13.4
1941	1,571,074	45.6	1,117,178	64.5	453,869	26.5
1942	1,752,590	47.7	1,219,156	66.1	533,434	29.1

Uneducated Korean children constituted another large group ignored in social indoctrination movements. School education had double-edged effects. On the one hand, it was an official and effective channel to disseminate a state ideology, to arouse national sentiment, and to teach the knowledge and techniques essential to individual and social development. On the other, it always had potential to challenge social norms and to promote protest against the state. Aware of the positive social function of education, Japan rapidly adopted compulsory education with the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890. However, in the fear that it might foster collective claims from Korean society and arouse national sentiment, the Government-General did not devote much attention to education and neglected the demands of Korean intellectuals to build more elementary schools.⁵⁹ Table 1 shows that the Government-General did not want to promote the growth of Korean education; in 1931, just over 17 percent of eligible children attended elementary school, whereas Japanese people in Korea had more education

opportunities than Koreans.⁶⁰

From the early 1930s, the Government-General began to address the limited access that Koreans had to education. Under the slogans to enhance the status of housewives at home and to offer more opportunities for them to serve the state and society, the Education Bureau organized lecture tours for wives. The lectures encouraged women to go to night schools and to work outside the home; they taught basic knowledge such information on hygiene, rational house economy, and managing their everyday lives. Women were also encouraged to form their own groups.⁶¹ As a result, the number of Wives' Groups reached 16,795 with 645,931 members in 1940. Under the policy of building one primary school in every town (*myŏn*) in 1934, school attendance, which was only 16.8 percent in 1927, doubled in just nine years to 33.2 percent in 1938, as indicated in Table 1 above. Nonetheless, this growth fell short of the goal Shiobara wanted to achieve. The total membership of wives' group was still quite small compared to the total population of women in 1940 (over 11.7 million), and elementary school attendance (33.2 percent) was insufficient for the task of making imperial subjects.

When the Government-General searched for an organization that could contribute to the effort for total war and overcome the limitations of existing state-led movements, the word "home" came to be used quite frequently in official discourse. It was because the home was a primary site for education and socializing that shaped daily habits and disseminated cultural customs. It was also because the home was historically seen as the space for women. The traditional notion of gender roles in which women managed the home and men outdoor activities were for men was still strongly rooted among Koreans.⁶² Not surprisingly, it was widely accepted that taking care of eating, housing, and clothing was the job of women.⁶³ Moreover, women were depicted as financial managers who ran the home economy, especially consumption, as shown by the fact that they were often called the *motozime* (Finance Minister) at home.⁶⁴

The word "home" was of course another term for the family. Totalitarianism required organizations free from internal tension among their members; however, political inequality, the peripheral economic status of Korea, and distinctive cultural practices in colonial rule were obstacles to this goal. Capitalism based on the pursuit of private interests endlessly created social differentiation. Moreover, generational gaps, differences in socioeconomic status, and gender norms also undermined social harmony. To contain wayward elements prompted by colonial rule and individual differences, the Government-General viewed the family as a harmonious place without contention among members. It was described as a space of voluntarism where people treated family affairs as their own business irrespective of their own interests, with the patriarch mediating any disputes, if they arose.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the ideal family was likened to political relations within the Japanese empire; for instance, just as righteousness mediates the relation

between the Japanese emperor and his subjects, affection mediates the relation between father and son.⁶⁶ The metaphor was well suited for the “family state” ideology at that time which stressed that Japan, unlike Western countries based on individualism, consisted of family-like intimacy and mental integration. In the allegory of family, Korea was seen as a part of the extended Japanese family.

Neighborhoods became a target of the Government-General both as a channel to extend its reach into homes and as a link between individual families and the Japanese state. Villages, which had been the basis for social indoctrination movements under Ugaki, were unsuitable for increasing women’s participation in the campaigns of the colonial government, for regulating individual consumption, and for promoting devotion to the wartime mobilization, even though it was useful to increase productivity and to organize cooperative labor. It was too big to maintain harmonious relations with its residents and to have deep understanding of each other. Neighborhood was viewed as an ideal form of community in which people could be open-minded and inter-dependent each other and get over economic hardships through mutual aid.

Once organizational preparations were completed, the Government-General established the Association for National Spiritual Mobilization in Korea to promote the Movement of National Spiritual Mobilization.⁶⁷ While provincial governments built local associations through the official administrative hierarchy, Shiobara broadly contacted Korean celebrities in business, education and religion to persuade them to join the Association.⁶⁸ At the bottom, the Association had 334,495 neighborhood associations made up of about ten households each as of the end of 1939, naming them Patriotic Neighborhood Associations (NAs).⁶⁹ From that time, Patriotic NAs, linking Koreans to the general headquarters, served as the core structure for all campaigns led by the colonial government. Depicted as the “soul” of all associations within the Association by Governor-General Minami,⁷⁰ it was the institutional result of the transition to the wartime system.

Conclusion

Mass movements led by the colonial government were central to the Japanese imperial ruling mechanism throughout the 1930s, prompted by the pursuit of economic autarky through the economic bloc and intensified by territorial expansion by the war. To accomplish these goals, the colonial government recognized the importance of the Korean masses, leading them to abandon their previous approach of allying with a minority of the dominant classes. While shifting the focus to the masses, the colonial government inaugurated the period of state-led mass movements in Korean history.

In promoting the new type of mass movement, the Government-General took different approaches to Korean society. In the early 1930s, Ugaki, aiming to enable Korea to make substantial contributions in building the Japanese economic bloc, felt that it was urgent to reduce widespread anti-Japan sentiment as expressed in nationalism and socialism and to enlighten Koreans. Feeling that this was a matter of social indoctrination, he put the Social Section in the Education Bureau in charge of making specific plans and implementing them. The Bureau revised its previous understanding of Korean tradition as a symbol of pre-modern ignorance and a source of anti-Japanese sentiment; instead, it sought to utilize tradition, stressing a sense of community against individualism. It organized mass movements by making full use of Korean traditional practices.

Around the time of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, Minami put more emphasis on the assimilation and reorganized the Government-General's campaigns in the name of National Spiritual General Mobilization. Frustrated that previous social indoctrination movements did not reach three-quarters of the Korean population, the Education Bureau paid more attention to the scale of the organization. The culture of the home was regarded as one of the biggest obstacles to making Korean society suitable for total war, because most Korean women stayed in the domestic sphere, a private realm that was hard to penetrate. At the same time, the extended family was used to defend the hierarchy within the Japanese empire. For them, the neighborhood, a residential space connecting individual households, was the optimal level at which to indoctrinate families and individuals. The final institutional outcome for the wartime imperialism was the creation of about 380,000 Patriotic Neighborhood Associations.

Notes

¹ Kim Yōng-hūi. *Ilche sidae nongch'on t'ongje chōngch'aek* (Regulation Policies over Rural Area during the Colonial Period). Sōul: Kyōngin Munhwasa, 2003; Yi Song-sun. *Ilcheha chōnsi nongōp chōngcha'ek kwa nongch'on kyōngje* (Agricultural Policies and Economy during the Wartime Period). Sōul: Sōnin, 2008; Yi Sūng-il, "Ilche ūi singminji chibae wa ilsang saenghwal ūi pyōnhwa (Japanese Colonial Rule and Changes in Everyday Life)," *Sahoe wa Yōksa* 67 (2005): p.6–40; Yun Hae-dong, *Chibae wa chach'i* (Domination and Self-Rule), Sōul: Yōksa Pipyōngsa, 2006; Gi-wook Shin, "1930nyōndae Nongch'on Chinhūng Undonggwa Nongch'on Sahoe Pyōnhwa", *Ilche P'asisūm Chibaejōngch'aek kwa Minjung Saenghwal*, Sōul: Hyeon, 2004.

² The Outline for Economic Control in Japan-Manchuria in 1934 was the outcome of their compromise. Louise Young, Chapter 5 in *Japan's Total Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Yi Sūng-nyōl, "1930 – yōndae chōnban gi ilbon kunbu ūi taeryuk ch'imnyakgwan kwa 'Chosōn kong'ōphwa' chōngch'aek," *Kuksagwan nonch'ong* 67 (1996), p.145–196.

³ Yi Sūng-nyōl, "1930 -nyōndae chōnbangi ilbon kunbu ūi taeryuk ch'imnyakgwan kwa 'Chosōn kong'ōphwa' chōngch'aek," *Kuksagwan nonch'ong* 67 (1996), 155–156; Pang Ki-jung, "1930-nyōndae Chosōn nongkong pyōngjin chōngch'aek kwa kyōngje t'ongje," *Tongbang hakchi* 120 (2003), p.80.

⁴ Ugaki Kazushige, *Ugaki Kazushige nikki* 2 (5 March 1935).

⁵ Ugaki Kazushige, *Ugaki Kazushige nikki* (23 June 1936), 1070.

⁶ Ugaki Kazushige, "Chōsen no shōrai," *Chōsen no kyōiku kenkyū* 73 (1934): p.3–4.

⁷ Ibid, p.11–21.

⁸ Ibid, p.4.

⁹ Pang Ki-jung, "1930-yōndae Chosōn nongkong pyōngjin chōngch'aek kwa kyōngje t'ongje," *Tongbang hakchi* 120 (2003), 86. Of the Japanese investment to Korea from 1932 to 1937, private capital amounted to 56.1 percent.

¹⁰ Sheldon Garon, Chapters 5–6 in *The State and Labor in Modern Japan* (Princeton University Press, 1987).

¹¹ Yi T'ae-hun, "Ilche ha ch'inil chōngch'i undong" (PhD diss., Yonsei University, 2010), p.144–153.

¹² Matsumoto Takenori, *Shokuminchi kenryoku to Chōsen nōmin* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 1998).

¹³ Kim In-ho, *Singminji Chosōn kyōngje ūi chongmal* (Sōul: Sinsōwōn, 2000), p.48.

¹⁴ Chōsen Sōtokufu, "Nōsangyoson shinkō undō no zenbō," *Chōsen ni okeru nōsangyoson shinkō undō* (1934), p.4–5, 10–11.

¹⁵ Ugaki Kazushige, "Chōsen no shōrai," *Chōsen no kyōiku kenkyū* 73 (1934), p.6.

¹⁶ Ugaki Kazushige, "Chōsen no shōrai," *Chōsen no kyōiku kenkyū* 73 (1934).

¹⁷ Takayuki Namae, *Shakai kōka jigyō gaikan* (1939), p.1–3.

¹⁸ Hori Kazuo, *Han'guk kūndae ūi kongōphwa*. Trans. Chu Ik-jong (Sōul: Chōnt'ong kwa Hyūndae, 2003), p.33–40.

¹⁹ Chōsen Sōtokufu, Gakumukyoku Shakai Kyōikuka, *Chōsen shakai kyōka yōran* (1937), p.33.

²⁰ Ugaki Kazushige, "Chōsen no shōrai," *Chōsen no kyōiku kenkyū* 73 (1934): p.22.

²¹ Kim In-ho, *Singminji Chosōn kyōngje ūi chongmal* (Sōul: Sinsōwōn, 2000), p.50–52.

²² Ugaki Kazushige, "Chōsen no shōrai," *Chōsen no kyōiku kenkyū* 73 (1934).

²³ Gakumukyoku Shakai Kyoikuka, *Chōsen shakai kyōka yōran* 1 (1923), p.1–16; Chōsen Sōtokufu. Gakumukyoku Shakaikka, *Chōsen shakai jigyō yōran* (1933), p.213.

²⁴ Hayashi began his career at the Bureau of Internal Affairs in 1912 and then worked in the Bureau of Railways, later becoming the provincial governor in North Chōlla and North Kyōngsang and finally the director of Education Bureau. Watanabe, who came to Korea in 1919, worked in the Bureau of Internal Affairs and spent eight years as chief of the Section of Agricultural Affairs. Just before being appointed as a director of the Education Bureau, he served as the provincial governor of South Kyōngsang. Tominaga, arriving in Korea in 1916, worked in the Bureau of Police, the Bureau of Home Affairs, later becoming the provincial governor of Kyōnggi. Their personal resumes are from *Han'guk Yōksa Chōngbo T'onghap* System.

²⁵ Hayashi was well known for the successful project to pave local roads in North Chōlla province. Watanabe created plans for the Campaign for Self-Revitalization, working as a chief of the Section of Agricultural Affairs for about eight years in the 1920s. Sufficiently well aware of Korean traditions to write several articles and a book on Community Compact (鄉約, *hyangyak* in Korean), Tominaga Fumikazu revised the traditional community compact system, renaming it Kwanbuk Hyangyak, and used it in the local improvement movement. *Chōsen kōrōsha* 69; Fumikazu Tominaga, *Mongyō no Chōsen* 75 (May 1921), 78 (August 1921), 79 (September 1921); Fumikazu Tominaga, "Chihō Jichisei no Jyunbi," *Chosōn* 15-1 (1931); Fumikazu Tominaga, "Hambuk no Hyangyak," *Chosōn* 17-10 (1933).

²⁶ "Sōtokufu oyobi ka 'to' kōkan jibutsuhyō," *Samch'ōlli* 10-5 (1939): p.59.

²⁷ Watanabe Yutahiro, "Chōsen no shakai jigyo ni tsuite," *Chōsen shakai jigyo* 11-9 (1933): p.9.

²⁸ Watanabe Yutahiro, "Chōsen no shakai jigyo ni tsuite," *Chōsen shakai jigyo* 11-9 (1933).

²⁹ Albert Park, "Visions of the Nation: Religion and Ideology in 1920s and 1930 Rural Korea" (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2007).

³⁰ Chi Su-gōl, *Ilche ha nongmin chohap undong yōn'gu* (Sōul: Yōksa Pip'yōngsa, 1993).

³¹ Chōsen Sōtokufu, "Nōsangyoson shinkō undō no zenbō," in *Chōsen ni okeru nōsangyoson shinkō undō* (1934), p.48.

³² Yu Man-gyōm, "Charyōk kaengsaeng iran muōt inga," *Chōsen* 17-2 (1933): p.9–11.

³³ Hayashi Shigeki, "Minshin sakkō undō no honji," *Shakai kyōka shiryō* (1933), p.126.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Yi Kak-chong, "Purak ūi sahoejōk yōn'gu," *Sinmin* 64 (1931).

³⁶ Yi Kak-chong, "Purak ūi sahoejōk yōn'gu," *Sinmin* 64 (1931): p.71, 80–85; Yi Kak-chong, "Chōsen no Nōsō to Shakaijigyou," *Chōsen shakai jigyo*. 5-3 (1927): p.2–5.

³⁷ Kim Yōng-hūi, *Ilche sidae nongch'on t'ongje chōngch'aek* (Kyōngin Munhwasa, 2003), p.367–372.

³⁸ Tominaga Fumikazu, *Ouji no Chōsen ni okeru jichi no hōga, Hyangyak no itban* (1923), p.1.

³⁹ Ibid, p.1–5.

⁴⁰ *Chosōn Kongnoja* 39; Sin Chu-baek, "1930 nyōndae hamgyōng -do chibang hyōngmyōngjōk nongmin chohap undong e kwanhan yōn'gu," *Sōngdae Sarim* 5 (1989).

⁴¹ Yi Chun-sik, "Hyōngmyōngjōk nongmin chohap undong kwa ilche ūi nongch'on t'ongje chōngch'aek" in *Ilche singminji sigi ūi t'ongch'i ch'eje hyōngsōng* (Sōul: Hye'an, 2006), p.254–262.

⁴² Tominaga Fumikazu, "Hondō no tsuite nōsonn no shisetsu," *Jiriki kōsē kihō* (1934), p.1–14.

⁴³ Chōsen Sōtokufu Gakumukyoku Shakai Kyōikuka, *Chōsen shakai kyōka yōran* (1937), p.51–54. At the national level, the number of organizations based on Community Compacts was recorded as 35,679 in May 1937, even though five provinces were excluded from the survey.

⁴⁴ Chōsen Gyōseigakukai, *Atarashiki Chōsen* (Chōsen Sōtokufu, Jyōhōka, 1944), p.19–21.

⁴⁵ Ugaki championed the downsizing of military divisions and the shortened military service period by the Kato cabinet, taking a risk of opposition from the Army and Kwantung Army. While his stay in Korea, his close ties with *zaibatsu* in Korean industrialization programs which the Army severely criticized, and his immigration policies of bringing Korean farmers to Manchuria which caused conflicts with the Kwantung Army. In the end, due to the trouble with the Army, he aborted organizing cabinet in 1937.

⁴⁶ For example, to relieve the poverty in rural areas, Ugaki promoted the Movement for Improving Rural Areas as well as made plans to reduce overpopulation in the countryside by migrating people to Manchuria. The main detail of the plan was the annual migration of 20,000 households, which ultimately would include up to 300,000 households. Ugaki wanted to establish a company responsible for overall issues on the Korean migration separate from the Japanese migration company, in the belief that it was unnecessary to remind Korean peasants of the discrimination against Japanese peasants, and to dispatch bureaucrats from the Government-General to Manchuria, because the Government-General were mostly more familiar with Koreans than anyone else. However, Kwantung army opposed the idea of establishing an independent migration company for Korea and the advance of Ugaki's people to Manchuria. It was resolved by Minami. Regarding the immigration issue of Korean peasants, the Government-General and Kwantung army concluded that the number of Korean migrants would be 10,000 annually and their place would be restricted to two provinces, and an independent migration company would handle Korean peasants. Tanaka Ryuichi, "Chōsen tōchi ni okeru zaiman Chōsenjin mondai," *Tōyō bunka kenkyū* 3 (Gakuzutsuin Daigaku Tōyō Bunka Kenkyusho, 2001), p.152–154.

⁴⁷ The number of factories increased from 4,613 in 1931 to 9,566 in 1941, more than doubling in ten years. Taking a look at the workers, the total number of factory workers was 102,000 at the end of 1930. This number increased up to 139,000 at the end of 1934, 188,000 at the end of 1936, and 231,000 in 1938. Workers in the mining industry increased from 31,000 in 1930 to 96,000 in 1934, 140,000 in 1936, and to 206,000 in 1938. The workers for the construction of pavements, railroads, harbors, and waterworks numbered 60,000 in 1934, 118,000 in 1936 and 193,000 in 1938. Hori Gazuo, *Han 'guk kundaie ūi kongōphwa*, trans. Chu Ik-jong (Sōul: Chōntong kwa Hyūndae, 2003), p.116–117.

⁴⁸ Hangmuguk Sahoe Kyoyukkwa, *Chōsen shakai kyōka yōran* (1937), p.20–47.

⁴⁹ Shiobara Tokisaburo, "Kēzaisen no suikō wa sēkatsu wo tōshite," *Sōdōin* 1-7 (1939): p.6.

⁵⁰ Mizuda Naoshō, "Chyochiku shyō no hitsuyō ni tsuite," *Jiriki Kōsē Kihō* 59 (1939), 11; Kim In-ho, "T'aep'yōngyang chōnjaeng sigi Sōul jiyōk ūi saengp'ilpum pae'gūp t'ongje silt'ae," *Sōulhak Yōn'gu* 26 (2006): p. 75–76; Anjako Yuka, "Chosōn Ch'ongdokpu ūi 'ch'ongdongwōn ch'eje hyōngsōng chōngch'aek" (PhD diss., Korea University, 2006), p.118.

⁵¹ Shiobara Tokisaburo, "Seidō undō no unyō," *Sōdōin* 2 -7 (1940), p.8–13.

⁵² Nakashima Shinichi, "Zentaishui to Nihon seishin," *Sōdōin* 2-1(1940), p.14–18.

⁵³ Shiobara Tokisaburo, "Kēzaisen no suikō wa sēkatsu wo tōshite," *Sōdōin* 1-7 (1939): 6; Shiobara Tokisaburo, "Seidō undō no unyō," *Sōdōin* 2 -7 (1940): 11-12; Shiobara Tokisaburo, "Kokumin seishin sōdōin undō ni tsuite," *Mongyō no Chōsen* (1939. 8): 2; Okazaki Shigeki, *Jidaio tsukuru otoko Shiobara Tokisaburo* (Tokyo, 1942), p.128–137.

⁵⁴ "Kokumin seishin sōdōin undō no tenbō," *Tsuho* 38 (1939): 13. Kokumin seishin sōdōin Chōsen renmei rijikyoku, "Kokumin seishin sōdōin Chōsen renmeino Soshiki to sono Katsudou," *Mongyō no Chōsen* 176 (1940), p.24–25.

⁵⁵ Shiobara Tokisaburo, "Kokumin seishin sōdōin undō ni tsuite," *Monkyō no Chōsen* (August 1939), p.13.

⁵⁶ O Sōng-Ch'ōl, *Singminji ch'odūng kyoyuk ūi hyōngsōng* (Sōul: Kyoyuk Kwahaksa, 2000), p.181.

⁵⁷ Son Chōng-mok, "Hijōjikyoku to hanto no josei," *Sōdōin* 1-2 (1939), p.29.

⁵⁸ O Sōng-Ch'ōl, *Singminji ch'odūng kyoyuk ūi hyōngsōng* (Seoul: Kyoyuk kwahaksa, 2000), p.133.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p.36–57.

⁶⁰ The number of Korean elementary school students per ten thousand was 250.2, whereas the number of Japanese students was 1360.0 in 1930. The gap got wider for higher education. In the middle school, it was 15.4 to 372.8 (about one thirty-fifth). In advanced education, it was 0.9 to 35.2, about one thirty-sixth. Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Tsūkē nenpō* (1932, 1942); O Sōng-ch'ōl, *Singminji ch'odūng kyoyuk ūi hyōngsōng* (Sōul: Kyoyuk Kwahaksa, 2000), p. 125.

⁶¹ “Chōsen no shakai jigyo (8),” *Chōsen no shakai jigyo* 12-6 (1934): 39; *Kyōngsōng ilbo* (14 August 1932); *Maeil Sinbo* (20 June 1935); Chōsen Sōtokufu Gakubukyoku Shakai Kyōikuka, *Chōsen Shakai Kyōiku yōran* (1941), p. 63–66.

⁶² See women’s magazines in the late 1930s. For instance, *Yōsōng* was full of articles, talks, and interviews with elite women about how to rationalize home life and to be rational housewives.

⁶³ Hayashi Shigeki, “Sahoe kyohwa ūi shisōl e taehaya,” *Chōsen* 16-9 (1932), p.4.

⁶⁴ Kawagishi Bunzaro, *Sōdōin* 2-9 (1940), p.4.

⁶⁵ Nakashima Shinichi, “Jentai shui to Nihon sheishin,” *Sōdōin* 2-1 (1940), p.14–18; Minami Jirō, “Watashi no kokuhu,” *Kokumin sōryoku* 3-4 (1941), p.2–3.

⁶⁶ “Naisenittai,” *Sōdōin* 1-7 (1939), p.11.

⁶⁷ “Chōsen renmeiwa imamade nani wo yatsute kitaka,” *Sōdōin* 1-1 (1939), p.49–52.

⁶⁸ Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Chōsen Renmei rijikyoku. “Kokumin Seishin Sōdōin Chōsen Renmei no soshiki to sono katsudō,” *Mongyō no Chōsen* 176 (1940), p.19.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p.19–23.

⁷⁰ “Waga kokuhu,” *Kokumin sōryoku* 3-4 (1941), p.3.